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Abstract
We examine a simple economic model of network formation where agents benefit from indirect
relationships. We show that small-world features—short path lengths between nodes together
with highly clustered link structures—necessarily emerge for a wide set of parameters. (JEL:
D85, A14, C72)
1. Introduction
Network structures play a central role in determining outcomes in many impor-
tant situations. Examples include the Internet, coauthor relationships among aca-
demics, joint research venture projects among firms, trade networks, the sharing
of job opening (and other sorts of) information through social networks, and P2P
systems for file sharing. Given the large and increasing prevalence of situations
where network structure are important, it is necessary to understand the proper-
ties of these networks and how various aspects of the network formation process
determine those properties.
A variety of large social networks have been shown to exhibit certain char-
acteristics. In this paper we explore two prominent ones that together embody
what has been coined as “small worlds” (see Milgram 1967 and Watts 1999).
The first characteristic is that such networks have small diameter and small aver-
age path lengths.1 The second characteristic is that such networks have high
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1. The diameter is the maximum distance between any two nodes of the network, where distance
between nodes is defined as the number of links in the shortest path between them. This stylized fact
is captured in the famous “six degrees of separation” of John Gaure’s play. Stanley Milgram (1967)
pioneered the study of path length through a clever experiment in which people had to send a letter
to another person who was not directly known to them.
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clustering coefficients relative to networks generated by an independent random
process.2
A number of models have been built to explain these (and other) character-
istics of social networks (see Jackson and Rogers 2004 for a discussion and list
of references). One prominent study is by Watts and Strogatz (1998). They show
that if one starts with a symmetric (regular) network where nodes are connected to
their nearest neighbors and where clustering is high, it takes only a small amount
of random rewiring of links in order to drastically reduce the network’s diameter
and thus obtain a small world. Klemm and Eguíluz (2002a, 2002b) find high clus-
tering in a model where nodes enter over time and only connect to other nodes in
a small set that are considered “active”, where this active set evolves over time.
High clustering and low diameter can also be explained via a model that incor-
porates random linking combined with links formed through local search along
network paths, as shown by Jackson and Rogers (2004).
While these models can yield small-world characteristics, they are “mechan-
ical” models, where a particular process of link formation (or reformation) is
specified, but there is not much explanation about why networks might form in
accordance with such processes.3 This paper examines economic-based reason-
ing for small worlds. We consider a model where links generate explicit costs
and benefits for agents, and then determine what networks will form when agents
form links in their self-interest. We analyze how the small-world features can be
traced to particulars of how the costs and benefits to agents vary.
We do not view “economic” models as a substitute for the more mechanical
models of network formation, but rather as a complement. The simple model
presented here captures some general features that one might expect many network
situations to exhibit. Yet the model is highly stylized, and the networks that are
formed are much too regular to resemble “real” networks. So while the model
provides some insights into the “why” behind small-world characteristics, it is far
too special to be a definitive model of real social networks. In contrast, some of
the mechanical models contain enough randomness and heterogeneity to produce
networks that appear closer to real networks, but they provide less insight into
why networks form as they do. By examining both types of models, we can better
understand how network structure is influenced by the (mechanical) node-meeting
process and by the (economic) incentives of agents to form links.
From the mechanical side it is known that in some situations a few random
connections between distant nodes can dramatically decrease network diameter,
while from the economic side we learn that in some situations, distant nodes
2. Clustering coefficients measure the frequency with which two neighbors of a given node are them-
selves connected. Ideas behind clustering have been important in sociology since Simmel (1908),
who pointed out the interest in triads. For more discussion on clustering and some empirical exam-
ples, see Watts (1999).
3. The Jackson and Rogers (2004) model can be seen to be consistent with utility maximization.
“zwu0250” — 2005/5/21 — page 619 — #3
Jackson and Rogers The Economics of Small Worlds 619
greatly benefit (in terms of net utility) from forming links precisely because
of the distance, which provides an answer as to why such shortcuts might be
formed. The fundamental intuitions that emerge from the economic side are: (i)
high clustering results from low costs of attachment to similar (nearby) nodes,
and (ii) low diameter results from the large benefit of attaching to dissimilar
(distant) nodes because of the substantial indirect access they provide to other
distant nodes. A limited number of such distant links emerge due to the high
costs, but in concert with the high interconnection rate at the local level, these
distant links substantially decrease networks diameter and average path length.
The model here is built on a variation of the connections model of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996), where agents benefit from their direct connections and also
from indirect connections. That is, friends of a friend generate value and so on.
The departure from that model is that we describe a simple geographically based
cost structure to forming links. This cost structure captures heterogeneity in link
costs in a simple manner: agents are grouped on “islands”, and costs of connection
are relatively low within an island and relatively high across islands. This cost
structure, together with the indirect benefits structure of the connections model,
generates the small-world characteristics.
There are other economic studies that have looked at the connections model
with geographic costs, such as Johnson and Gilles (2000), Carayol and Roux
(2003), and Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2004). The first two papers examine
situations where agents are arranged on a line or circle and link costs are propor-
tional to distance. Intuitively, such models generate higher rates of connection
on a local scale, and due to the positive indirect benefits from connection they
sustain some distant connections, thus exhibiting small-world features. Indeed,
Carayol and Roux (2003) show that, in certain situations, some of the pairwise
stable networks exhibit small-world characteristics, and through simulation that,
at least for one parameterization, stochastic stability tends to select small-world
networks. Thus, the important insight— that connections-like models can result
in small-world networks— is not new to our paper but rather is due to Carayol and
Roux (2003).4 The model of Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2004) allows for
a more general geographic cost structure than those cited above, and includes as
a special case the cost structure that we analyze here. However, Galeotti, Goyal,
and Kamphorst focus on the case where benefits decay negligibly with distance,
so that any equilibrium network is minimally connected. Because minimally con-
nected networks exhibit no clustering, their results are in contrast to what we find
here, where decay is a central feature of the model and clustering is an important
aspect of the emerging networks.
4. Such characteristics can also be seen in some of the networks found to be pairwise stable by
Johnson and Gilles (2000), but this aspect was not their focus.
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The simple islands-based variation of the (truncated) connections model is
much more tractable than other geographic variations of the connections model.
This allows us to obtain a more complete picture of the networks that emerge
in equilibrium and to show that all stable and, in fact, all efficient networks
necessarily exhibit the small-world characteristics of small diameter and high
clustering.
2. Background Definitions
2.1. Networks
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote a set of agents, which we identify with nodes. A
network g is a list of unordered pairs of agents {i, j} describing which agents are
connected. For simplicity, write ij to represent the link {i, j}, so ij ∈ g indicates
that i and j are linked under the network g. A shorthand notation for the network
obtained by adding (deleting) link ij to an existing network g is g + ij (g − ij ).
For any network g and agent i, let Ni(g) be the neighborhood of i under g,
that is, the set of agents linked to i in the network g, so that Ni(g) = {j | ij ∈ g}.
2.2. Utility and Efficiency
Let ui(g) (defined below) denote the net utility that agent i receives under the
network g, inclusive of all costs and benefits.
A network is efficient if it maximizes∑i ui(g). This is a strong definition of
efficiency, which corresponds to a utilitarian measure (or Pareto 1896 if transfers
are unrestricted).
2.3. Pairwise Stability
A network g is pairwise stable if
(i) for all ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj (g) ≥ uj (g − ij), and
(ii) for all ij /∈ g, if ui(g + ij) > ui(g) then uj (g + ij) < uj (g).
Pairwise stability captures the idea that mutual consent is necessary to form
or maintain a link. A network is stable if no two individuals both want to add a
link and no single individual wants to sever a link. This is a weak requirement;
it does not, for instance, consider changes in multiple links at the same time.5
5. See Jackson (2004) for a review of some of the different methods that have been used to study
strategic network formation.
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Nevertheless, since our results will show that all pairwise stable networks turn
out to exhibit small-world features, the results are strengthened by the use of a
stability concept that is permissive.
2.4. Distance and Diameter
A path in a network g ∈ G between agents i and j is a sequence of agents
i1, . . . , iK such that ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} with i1 = i and
iK = j . The length of such a path is K − 1, the number of links involved. The
distance between two agents i and j denoted d(i, j), is the minimum path length
between i and j (and set to be infinite if no such path exists). The diameter of
a network g is then defined as d¯(g) = maxij∈N :d(i,j)<∞ d(i, j), the maximum
distance between any two connected nodes.
2.5. Clustering
There are a variety of ways that clustering has been measured. One is a well-
known measure from the sociology literature (see, e.g., Wasserman and Faust
1994) that examines the percentage of “transitive triples.” This technique looks
at cases where node i has a link to j and j has a link a to k, and then asks whether
i has a link to k. The percentage of times in a network that the answer is “yes”
is the fraction of transitive triples.6 To distinguish this from the other common
notion of clustering, we call this total clustering, defined as
C(g) =
∑
i #{jk ∈ g | k = j, j ∈ Ni(g), k ∈ Ni(g)}∑
i #{jk | k = j, j ∈ Ni(g), k ∈ Ni(g)}
.
Another measure, which is sometimes easier to compute on a given net-
work, is a variation whereby clustering is measured in the neighborhood of each
individual node and then averaged across individuals (see, e.g., Watts 1999). We
refer to this as average clustering, which is based on the following definition of
individual clustering for a node i:
Ci(g) = #{jk ∈ g | k = j, j ∈ Ni(g), k ∈ Ni(g)}#{jk | k = j, j ∈ Ni(g), k ∈ Ni(g)} .
The average clustering coefficient is then
Cavg(g) =
∑
i
Ci(g)
n
.
6. This fraction has been referred to as “clustering” in the recent statistical physics literature (e.g.,
see the survey by Newman 2003 and is also sometimes referred to as “cliquishness.”
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3. Small Worlds in an Islands–Connections Model
We examine a simple “islands” version of the (truncated) connections model of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). There are K islands, each with J agents on it.
Forming a link between agents i and j costs each of the agents c if i and j are on
the same island and C otherwise, where C > c > 0.
This geography provides a simple way of introducing heterogeneity among
agents. Distance can be thought of as representing actual physical separation,
but can also describe differences among agents in terms of social or politi-
cal preferences, research interests, compatibility of R & D programs, and so
forth.
There are many interpretations of the benefits, but one way to think of a link
is as a social relationship that can offer benefits in terms of favors, information,
and the like. The important aspect is that agents also benefit from indirect rela-
tionships: a friend of a friend relationship confers benefits, although of a lesser
value than a direct friendship, as do “friend of a friend of a friend” relationships,
and so forth. The benefit deteriorates geometrically with the distance of the rela-
tionship, as described by the parameter δ ≤ 1. However, agents pay costs only
for maintaining their direct relationships.
The overall utility to an agent i in network g is
ui(g) =
∑
j =i:d(i,j)≤D
δd(i,j) −
∑
j :ij∈g
cij ,
where cij = c if i and j are on the same island and cij = C otherwise.7,8
This version of the connections model truncates benefits at a length D. Thus,
no indirect benefits are obtained from other agents who are at a distance of more
than D. For large D, the basic connections model and the truncated connections
model can be quite similar. The truncation here seems natural and is particularly
helpful in making the results simple to present and prove. We assume D ≥ 2,
since otherwise agents benefit only from direct links and the network issues are
degenerate. When D ≥ KJ − 1 the maximal distance is never a constraint, so
the model is identical to the basic connections model.
7. This cost structure is the same as that of the insiders–outsiders model of Galeotti, Goyal and
Kamphorst (2004).
8. There are some straightforward ways in which this could be extended and remain fairly tractable.
For instance, one could have an island structure within an island structure, so that there are three or
more cost levels, indicating at what level individuals inhabit the same island. A second extension is
to allow individuals to belong to several islands at once and have costs determined by whether or
not two agents have an island in common.
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3.1. Small-World Characteristics of the Islands Connections Model
We now show how the islands-connections model generates small diameter and
high clustering, resulting in small-world networks.
Proposition 1. If c < δ − δ2 and C < δ + (J − 1)δ2, then any network that is
pairwise stable and/or efficient is such that
1. the agents on any given island are completely connected to each other,
2. the diameter is no greater than D + 1, and
3. a lower bound on individual, average, and total clustering is (J−1)(J−2)
J 2K2
.
9
Proof. If two agents on the same island are not connected in some network, then
they would each gain at least δ−δ2 −c > 0 by adding the link, and so the network
cannot be pairwise stable or efficient. Now suppose that there are two agents (on
distinct islands), say i and j , such that d(i, j) ≥ D + 2. As just argued, in any
pairwise stable or efficient network, j is directly connected to all members of his
island and so is i. Thus i is at a distance of at least D + 1 from each member of
j ’s island and so enjoys no benefit from any of these agents; the same is true for j
from i’s island. Thus, by linking to j, i would gain at least δ+ (J −1)δ2 −C > 0
(and vice versa), so this cannot be pairwise stable or efficient.
We next show that a lower bound for an individual’s clustering (and thus
average clustering) occurs when each of an agent’s inter-island links is involved
in no transitive triples. To obtain the lower bound on clustering, we now note that
in the case where at most one connection from a given agent to any other island
exists, the worst case for the clustering calculation is when none of the node’s
distant links are themselves connected. All of the agent’s pairs of intra-island
neighbors are themselves neighbors, and none of the agent’s pairs involving an
inter-island neighbor are linked. Thus there are (J − 1)(J − 2)/2 pairs of i’s
neighbors that are linked out of a maximal total of (J + L − 1)(J + L − 2)/2
pairs of neighbors, if the individual has L inter-island links. This leads to a lower
bound of (J − 1)(J − 2)/[(J +L− 1)(J +L− 2)]. Noting that L ≤ J (K − 1),
we have a loose lower bound of (J − 1)(J − 2)/(J + J (K − 1))2, resulting in
the claimed expression.
The lower bound on the total clustering coefficient is established as follows.
For a given network, write i’s clustering coefficient as ai/bi , where ai is the
number of links among neighbors in i’s neighborhood and bi is the number
of pairs of neighbors in i’s neighborhood. We have established a lower bound
9. For the bounds on clustering we assume that δ − δ2 = C. If δ − δ2 = C then there is a great
deal of indifference over links, and the set of pairwise stable networks explodes.
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for ai/bi . Note that total clustering is (
∑
i ai)/
∑
i bi) and that this is clearly
greater than mini (ai/bi).10
The case identified in Proposition 1 can be considered a small world in a
rather strong sense. The diameter is bounded above by D + 1, and average path
lengths will be considerably smaller still since each island is fully connected.
Next observe that average clustering is approximated by K−2. Thus, clustering
can remain large when n is very large, provided that per-island population is not
too small. In cases where C is large enough so that the number of inter-island links
is lower (bounded by KJ ), then the lower bound for clustering is even higher (on
the order of (J/(J +K))2); and then even for large K relative to J , the clustering
is much larger than one would observe in a completely random network (which
goes to zero as the population grows, holding the probability of links constant, as
first studied by Erdös and Rényi 1960).
We emphasize that Proposition 1 applies to networks that are either pairwise
stable or efficient, and thus it shows that there are some similarities between
these sets of networks. Obtaining the precise relationship between pairwise stable
networks and efficient networks is more complex. We are able to characterize the
efficient networks in some cases when the intra-island costs are low, and they
show some interesting patterns. From this we can see that for some range of
interisland costs the pairwise stable and efficient network coincide, whereas for
other cost ranges the set of pairwise stable networks, though always exhibiting
small-world features, can be quite varied.
Proposition 2. Let c < δ−δ2. In any efficient network, each island is internally
completely connected. Inter-island links in efficient networks are characterized
as follows.
1. If C < δ − δ2 then the unique efficient network is the completely connected
network.
2. If δ − δ2 < C < δ − δ3 and K = 2, then the efficient networks are those
such that there are exactly J links between the two islands, and on at least one
island each agent is involved in exactly one of the J links.
3. If δ − δ3 + 2(J − L − 1)(δ2 − δ3) < C < δ − δ3 + 2(J − L)(δ2 − δ3)
and K = 2, then the efficient networks are those such that there are exactly
1 ≤ L < J links between the two islands and no agent is involved in more
than one of these links.
4. If δ − δ3 + 2(J − 2)(δ2 − δ3) < C and K = 2, then the efficient networks
have at most one link between the two islands.
10. It is straightforward to check that (a1 + a2)/(b1 + b2) ≥ min(a1/b1, a2/b2). The result then
follows by induction.
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Case 4 can be broken down further: for low costs there is exactly one link
between the two islands; and for higher costs the islands are isolated. When
there are many islands, the characterization of efficient networks gets a bit more
complicated, as star like structures can be efficient. For instance, when K is very
large and C < δ − δ3, completely connecting all agents within each island, and
then connecting every agent on every island other than island 1 directly to the
same agent on island 1 can be more efficient than having intra-island links that
don’t all pass through the same island.
Proof. Given that c < δ − δ2, efficiency clearly requires all intra-island links
to form. The only question concerns the configuration of inter-island links. If
C < δ − δ2, then clearly the unique efficient network is complete.
Now consider the case where δ − δ2 < C < δ − δ3. Fix a pair of islands
and call the number of links between them L. If L < J , then there is at least one
agent on each island without a link to the other island. Connecting them adds at
least 2(δ − δ3 − C) > 0. Thus, efficiency requires that L ≥ J . If L > J and
not all agents on an island are involved in one of these links, then the links can
be rearranged so that each agent on that island is involved in at least one link
without reducing total utility. So suppose that all agents on one of the islands are
involved in at least one link to the other island. There must be an agent on that
island with more than one link to the other island. Removing one such link saves
2C − 2(δ − δ2) > 0. So efficiency requires L = J in this cost range. Consider
the expression
V (x1, x2, L) = 2Lδ + 2[Jx1 + Jx2 − x1x2](δ2 − δ3) − 2Lδ2 + 2J 2δ3,
which is the utility obtained by the members of island 1 from connections to
island 2 plus the reverse, where xi ≤ L is the number of agents on island i having
links to the other island. Maximizing V with respect to x1 and x2 when L = J
requires that x1 = L or x2 = L, i.e., on at least one island all agents must have a
link to the other island. Maximizing V when L < J requires that x1 = x2 = L,
i.e., no agent can be involved in more than one link to the other island. Now, if
there are L links between two islands (where the links satisfy this condition), the
utility that agents on one of the islands get from connections to agents on the
other island is (J −L)(Lδ2 + (J −L)δ3)+L(δ + (J − 1)δ2). The gain in utility
from having L + 1 links versus L links is then δ − δ3 + 2(J − L − 1)(δ2 − δ3).
The condition in part 3 then follows from having it be worthwhile to add L links
but not L + 1.
If δ−δ3 +2(J −2)(δ2 −δ3) < C, then any link beyond the first one between
two islands will not be beneficial. Hence, in this case there is at most one link
between any two islands, as stated in part 4.
These results apply to cases where the intra-island cost of connections is low
enough that agents are completely connected within their own island. The analysis
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becomes more complex when the intra-island connection cost rises, so that not all
agents within an island are connected. Nevertheless, we can still establish some
small-world characteristics for a higher cost range. For instance, we can deduce
bounds on diameter as follows. Consider the case where δ − δ2 < c < δ and
C <δ+ (J −1)δD . Even though an individual island will not be completely con-
nected, if two agents on the same island were at distance greater than D, then each
would gain at least δ − c > 0 by connecting, so the network could not have been
pairwise stable. In light of this, consider agents i and j on different islands and
suppose that d(i, j) ≥ 2D+1. Then each would be at distance at least D+1 from
every agent on the other’s island and so would derive no benefit from them. Thus,
i and j could each secure at least δ+(J −1)δD−C > 0 by the adding a link to the
other island. Therefore the diameter of all pairwise stable networks is no greater
than 2D, and the average path length is smaller than this worst case distance.
While high intra-island costs do not conflict with obtaining small diameters,
clustering is another matter. Positive clustering requires the presence of “trian-
gles,” where an agent’s neighbors are connected to each other. Although this can
occur in pairwise stable networks when c > δ − δ2, it is not a general charac-
teristic of pairwise stable networks in this cost range.11 We make two remarks
in this regard. First, there is still a sense in which the resulting pairwise stable
networks will be “clustered” despite the possible absence of triangles. Intuitively,
clustering should measure the relative density of nearby links compared to far
away links, but the common measures fail to capture this more general property.
Our islands cost structure will still generate this kind of feature. Second, there
is a sense in which “islands” should be defined by the (given) relative costs—so
that agents placed in the same island are, in fact, precisely those who have low
costs of linking to each other and thus will naturally tend to be clustered.
4. Discussion
In addition to the small-world properties there are other characteristics shared
by many socially generated networks, such as a distribution of node degrees
(number of links per node) that are approximately “scale-free” or follow a power
law, at least in the upper tail.12 Thus, there tend to be many more nodes with
very small and very large degrees than one would see if the links were formed
independently.13
11. Note that this is not an artifact of the “islands” geography, since any connections-based model
will have an analogous property involving the costs of the shortest links.
12. The degree of a node is the cardinality of its neighborhood. An example of a distribution
satisfying a power law is the Pareto distribution, where the frequency of nodes with degree d is
proportional to d−γ for some γ > 1. For and informative overview, see Mitzenmacher (2004).
13. See. Jackson and Rogers (2004) for a more complete list of the properties and references for
them.
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In our model there is substantial room for variation in degree across nodes—
for instance, in who forms inter-island links—as well as in the pattern of intra-
island links. There is little in the models that explicitly ties down this structure.
A conjecture is that a variation of the model that marries a random process to how
nodes meet with the economic and strategic concerns analyzed here would begin
to account for the degree distribution and could result in features consistent with
observables.
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